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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides a game-theoretical 
description of social and motivational 
influence over belief dynamics of two arguing 
agents that hold contrasting views. The formal 
analysis shows how social influence depends 
on both (1) the agent’s own motives and (2) 
her beliefs concerning the motives  of the other 
agent. Moreover, game-theoretical modelling 
of dialogical interaction with mutual ignorance 
of the agents’ motivational profiles reveals that 
(3) some information on the counterpart’s 
motivations have greater diagnostic value than 
others, and (4) such discontinuity in 
informational value again depends on the 
agent’s own motivations. Hence this game-
theoretical analysis captures several features of 
the rich interplay between motivations and 
beliefs, and it allows for prediction of the 
specific motivational pressure being exerted on 
the agent’s belief dynamics, given her current 
frame of mind. Here the model is applied both 
to agents with exhaustive knowledge of each 
other preferences, and to agents with only 
partial assumptions on the motivational profile 
of their counterpart. In the final sections, we 
discuss the extension of this analysis to the 
single-agent case, and future empirical 
verification of the predictions generated by the 
model, via social experiments (e.g. 
experimental economics) and computational 
models (e.g. agent-based social simulation). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social influence over belief formation and 
change had been theoretically modelled and 
empirically verified both in social psychology 
(Asch, 1952; Kruglanski, 1980; Kunda, 1990; 
Castelfranchi & Miceli, 1998; Forgas, 2000) 
and in philosophical epistemology (Goldman, 
1999). These studies suggest that beliefs do not 
simply capture a relation between an agent and 
the world, as the classical notion of episteme as 
‘true belief’ implies. Beliefs are also social 
entities, depending on social relations for their 
origins and support (they often derive from 
social sources and are justified by the fact that 
others believe so; Asch, 1952), for their use 
(e.g. communication, coordination), and for 
their functions (e.g. to be shared, to provide a 
common ground). 
In contrast with these results, standard 
formalisms of belief dynamics such as AGM-
style belief revision (Alchourrón et al., 1985; 
Gärdenfors, 1988), Truth-Maintenance 
Systems (Huns & Bridgeland, 1991; Doyle, 
1992) and probabilistic models (Berger, 1985; 
Boutilier, 1998) usually fail to consider 
motivation, both social and individual, as a 
relevant factor in defining and shaping the 
agent’s belief set. While the coordination of 
motivation and beliefs is a typical problem in 
agent architectures (Castelfranchi, 1998), the 
influence of motivation over belief formation 
and change is not usually investigated. The 
same applies to Bayesian analyses: although 
the connection between decision-making and 
beliefs is an obvious focus of interest (Berger, 
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1985), these approaches typically keep utility 
(motivation) quite separate from probability 
(belief), without addressing the influence of 
the former on the latter. As for AGM belief 
revision, it might be said to be implicitly 
driven by the ‘motivation’ of maintaining a 
coherent set of beliefs, avoiding contradictions 
when faced with new information in contrast 
with previous convictions (Harman, 1986; 
Gärdenfors, 1988; Levi, 1991). However, this 
is rather a basic assumption of the model, 
which does not play a specific role in orienting 
the agent toward believing or disbelieving any 
particular claim. 
This lack of interest for social and 
motivational influence in formal models of 
belief dynamics is quite puzzling, if contrasted 
with the overwhelming evidence of such 
influence provided by both empirical and 
theoretical research in cognitive psychology 
(Festinger, 1957; Kruglanski, 1980; Swann, 
1990; Castelfranchi, 1996; Paglieri, 2004), 
social psychology (Asch, 1952; Kunda, 1990; 
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1998; Forgas, 2000), 
economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and 
computer science (Picard, 1997). In natural 
cognitive agents (e.g. humans), motivation 
does play a role in shaping the agent’s beliefs, 
both by focusing her attention on those issues 
and data she considers more relevant and 
urgent (Kruglanski, 1980; Kunda, 1990), and 
by orienting her assessment of available 
information according to specific patterns, 
such as social conformity (Asch, 1952), 
confirmatory tendency (Festinger, 1957), self-
verification (Swann, 1990), denial (Miceli and 
Castelfranchi, 1998). Moreover, similar 
motivational biases are not necessarily 
irrational or anti-adaptive: while relevance-
based belief assessment can lead to tunnel 
vision and even obsession, some kind of goal-
directed focusing is indeed needed for any 
resource-bounded agent, in order to efficiently 
perform belief revision (Cherniak, 1986); 
confirmation and self-verification can 
degenerate in wishful thinking and self-
delusion, but they are also basic defence 
mechanisms to preserve from loss of 
motivation, and they often serve as simple 
effective heuristics for specific tasks (Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2000). 
However, the aim of this paper is not to 
make the case for motivational influence over 
belief dynamics in general, but rather to focus 
on social motivation within a specific formal 
framework, i.e. game theory. The basic 
research questions addressed here are the 
following: Provided social motivation does 
play a role in belief dynamics, what exactly is 
this role? Is it always one and the same, or 
does it depend on the motivational profile of 
the agent, i.e. different motivations might 
affect in different ways the agent’s belief 
dynamics? Is there any way of predicting the 
specific social impact over belief change, 
given the agent’s motivations? 
Our work tackles these questions by 
applying a game-theoretical approach to belief 
change in a dialogical setting, in which two 
agents (called P and ∼P) debate a controversial 
point on which they have mutually excluding 
views, and each of them has to decide whether 
to maintain her own view or change it and 
assume the view of the opponent. Different 
motivational profiles (i.e. preference orderings 
over possible outcomes) are defined and 
contrasted, highlighting the emergent belief 
revision strategies of the agents – with either 
complete or partial assumptions on each other 
preferences. The formal analysis emphasizes 
social influence in shaping individual beliefs, 
and the pivotal role played by motivation in 
this process. 
 
MOTIVATED DIALOGUES: 
TWO AGENTS ARGUING 
WITH EACH OTHER 
 
Imagine two agents confronting each 
other on a given issue, on which they hold 
contrasting and mutually excluding views. Let 
us call these agents P and ∼P, simply to signify 
their initial disagreement on the issue under 
consideration. Each agent is faced with an 
alternative: either she maintains (M) her own 
view, or she revises (R) it in favor of the 
opponent’s claim. This produces four possible 
outcomes. 
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 ∼P 
 Maintain Revise 
Maintain disagreement (conservative) agreement P P 
Revise agreement ∼P disagreement (role-reversal) 
 
Table1. Possible outcomes of interaction. 
 
Whenever one agent revises her previous 
claim, while the other maintains her own view, 
the dialogue ends with a mutual agreement – 
either on P or ∼P. Otherwise, the initial 
disagreement still holds, either because of a 
general conservative attitude (both agents 
maintain their own views), or because of a 
complete role-reversal, in which both agents 
revise their claims, so they end up to be again 
on opposite sides of the barricade – they just 
traded places. 
This dialogical setting is obviously highly 
idealized, since here we assume an all-or-
nothing situation in which tertium non datur, 
i.e. the agent cannot withdraw her previous 
claim without converging on the opponent’s 
view. In real-life argumentation, this is not 
always the case. Imagine for instance two 
agents debating on whether option A is better 
than B, or vice versa. The first agent holds that 
A is better than B, while the second agent 
believes B to be better than A: in this case, 
they might come to an agreement by dropping 
both their claims, and concluding that options 
A and B are simply indifferent. More 
generally, people usually do not argue on 
isolated claims, but rather on complex issues 
with several features. One of the most viable 
ways towards agreement is compromise, that 
can be roughly understood as the practice of 
conceding to the opponents on some points, 
while maintaining one’s own view on other 
aspects. If we include compromise as a 
possible move for our arguing agents, we 
obtain a richer picture of the possible 
interactive outcomes. Or we can even go a step 
further, characterizing compromise itself as a 
continuum, as showed on the lower half of 
Figure 1. 
 
 ∼P 
 Maintain Compromise Revise 
Maintain disagree (conservative) disagree agree P 
Compromise disagree agreement (compromise) disagree P 
Revise agree ∼P disagree disagree (reversal)  
 
 
Figure 1. Modelling compromise: 
Discrete vs. continuous analysis 
 
However, in this paper we will confine 
ourselves to the most straightforward case of 
dialogical interaction, the all-or-nothing 
situation described in Table 1. This will serve 
to make our analysis clear and easy to follow, 
even from readers not familiar with game-
theoretical modeling. Besides, the extension of 
our methods and results to more complex cases 
of interaction, as those summarized in Figure 
1, is a mere matter of technical exercise, and it 
does not imply any significant divergence from 
the basic principles discussed here. 
So, given this simple dialogical setting, 
the question is: What would an agent prefer to 
do – maintain or revise her view? Under which 
conditions each option would be better, and 
why? 
Approaches which deny or minimize the 
role of motivation in belief dynamics would 
answer that (1) it does not matter the option 
chosen by the opponent in determining the 
preferred option of the agent, since belief 
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formation should rest only on epistemic 
factors, such as factual credibility and hard 
evidence; for the same reason, (2) it does not 
even matter what are the agent’s own 
preferences concerning social outcomes of the 
dialogue (agreement or disagreement), because 
she should not be biased by her will in 
assessing her beliefs. 
While non-negotiability of beliefs (i.e., 
the fact that an agent is not free to believe at 
will, but she rather needs convincing reasons 
to do so) is indeed a distinctive feature of 
cognitive systems1 (Harman, 1986; Levi, 1991; 
Castelfranchi, 1996), at the same time 
motivational influences are equally well-
known hallmarks of belief dynamics 
(Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990; Paglieri, 
2004): hence «[t]he biasing role of goals is 
thus constrained by one’s ability to construct a 
justification for the desired conclusion: people 
will come to believe what they want to believe 
only to the extent that reason permits» (Kunda, 
1990: 483). With reference to our dialogical 
setting, the point is to see whether is possible 
to define a specific outcome such as to be the 
agent’s ‘desired conclusion’, once given the 
agent’s own goals (here represented in terms of 
preference orderings) and her beliefs 
concerning the goals of her opponent. This 
desired conclusion will not represent the 
deterministic outcome of process (what the 
agent will actually believe), but rather the 
focus of the motivational pressure applied over 
her belief dynamics (what she would like to 
believe). As Kunda remarked, the resulting 
influence and bias will necessarily be only 
indirect, e.g. in terms of selective attention, 
reasoning patterns, choice of heuristics, etc. 
Here our purpose is not to detail the nature of 
such influence, but rather to frame it in a 
strategic setting and to predict, given the 
                                                           
1 Philosophically oriented readers might want to 
compare non-negotiability of beliefs with doxastic 
voluntarism, as a partially opposed view of belief 
formation (see Wansing, 2000 for a recent survey). 
However, since this debate does not bring any major 
consequence on the present study, we will skip 
further references to doxastic voluntarism in this 
paper. 
individual motivations of the two agents, their 
rational preferences concerning the social 
outcomes. 
 
MOTIVATIONAL PROFILES IN 
DIALOGICAL BELIEF DYNAMICS 
 
To model realistic motivational profiles 
on belief dynamics for cognitive agents in a 
dialogical setting, we first define the 
preferences of each agent on both the outcome 
of her own belief dynamics (cognitive 
attitudes), and the integration with the other 
agent’s belief dynamics (social attitudes). 
Technically, these basic attitudes are modeled 
as partial orderings over possible outcomes of 
the dialogue. 
 
Attitude Criterion (partial ordering) 
Cognitive:  
CONSERVATIVE Maintain is better than Revise 
(MM or MR) > (RM or RR) 
EXPLORATIVE Revise is better than Maintain 
(RM or RR) > (MM or MR) 
Social:  
COOPERATIVE Agree is better than Disagree 
(MR or RM) > (MM or RR) 
ANTAGONISTIC Disagree is better than Agree 
(MM or RR) > (MR or RM) 
 
Table 2.  Basic attitudes in belief dynamics. 
 
Each agent is characterized by both 
cognitive and social attitudes, i.e. preferences 
on the outcome that involve both her own 
cognitive processes and their integration with 
those of the counterpart. The point is, which 
one of those attitude is dominant in the agent’s 
mind? Is the agent either individual-oriented 
(i.e. the cognitive attitude rules over the social 
attitude), or is she social-oriented (the social 
attitude is prominent with respect to the 
cognitive attitude)? By answering this 
question, we are capable of capturing eight 
different motivational profiles (i.e. total 
preference orderings over the possible 
outcomes of the dialogue) – four of them 
individual-oriented, and four social-oriented. 
Each of these motivational profile roughly 
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describes a possible ‘psychological type’ or 
‘personality’, and it is liable to influence the 
agent’s belief dynamics in different ways. 
 
Individual-oriented Motivational Profiles 
 Primary Cognitive Attitude 
 CONS EXPL 
COOP Despotic (MR>MM>RM>RR) 
Pliable 
(RM>RR>MR>MM) Secondary Social 
Attitude ANTA Headstrong (MM>MR>RR>RM) 
Whimsical 
(RR>RM>MM>MR)  
Social-oriented Motivational Profiles 
 Primary Social Attitude 
 COOP ANTA 
CONS Open-minded 
(MR>RM>MM>RR) 
Contentious 
(MM>RR>MR>RM) Secondary Cognitive 
Attitude EXPL Agreeable (RM>MR>RR>MM) 
Polemist 
(RR>MM>RM>MR)  
 
Table 3. Motivational profiles 
in dialogical belief dynamics 
 
Here a certain motivational profile is 
understood as emerging from the integration of 
both cognitive and social attitudes of the agent, 
depending on (1) the nature of such attitudes2, 
and (2) their relative importance for the agent. 
For instance, an agent that is both conservative 
and cooperative, but that gives priority to 
conservationism over cooperation, is 
stigmatized as a Despotic agent, since she tries 
to reach an agreement only on her own views, 
and is willing to give up the agreement with 
the counterpart, if this would force her to 
change her own opinions. In contrast, an Open-
minded agent is once again both conservative 
and cooperative, but here the latter tendency is 
stronger than the former: hence the agent, 
although preferring as optimal an agreement 
                                                           
2 For the sake of simplicity, here we consider only 
the cases where the agent has a total preferences 
ordering over the outcomes of the dialogical 
interaction, i.e. no outcome is considered equally 
preferred or indifferent with respect to any other. 
We leave the treatment of interaction of agents with 
incomplete motivational profiles (i.e. partial 
orderings over the outcomes) to future works. 
on her own terms, is ready to drop her previous 
claim, rather than jeopardizing cooperation. 
Clearly enough, despotism is a typical 
individual-oriented attitude (the private 
outcome is more relevant than the social one), 
while an open-mind motivational profile is 
strongly social-oriented (the social outcome 
has priority over the agents’ own preferences 
over their individual beliefs). Similar 
considerations apply to all the motivational 
profiles summarized in Table 3. Which brings 
us to the crucial point of this analysis: Given a 
specific preferences profile for each agent, 
what kind of influence (motivational and 
social) is to be expected over belief dynamics 
in their interaction? 
 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE OVER BELIEF 
DYNAMICS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE OPPONENT’S MOTIVATIONS 
 
In this section we assume that both agents 
know exactly (1) their own preferences over 
possible outcomes, and (2) the motivational 
profile of each other; on the basis of such 
assumptions, we are able to work out their 
desirable outcome and preferred option. Notice 
that here, as in the rest of this paper, ‘desirable 
outcome’ and ‘preferred option’ are meant as 
technical means to model motivational and 
social pressures: hence the ‘desirable outcome’ 
is not necessarily the solution that the agent 
will achieve or even try to achieve, but rather 
the state of the world that would be most 
pleasant to reach; similarly, her ‘preferred 
option’ simply captures the direction (either to 
maintain or to revise old convictions) towards 
which the agent’s belief dynamics might be in 
fact biased. 
This said, let us consider first the case 
with two players who share the same 
motivational profile. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
it turns out that for all pairs of individual-
oriented types there is only one Nash 
equilibrium, hence the dominant pressure is 
straightforward – as exemplified in Table 4 
with two Whimsical agents, that would be both 
happy to change their initial views and fail to 
achieve mutual agreement (in tables from now 
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on, the first pay-off refers to the row-player, 
the second to the column-player). 
 
 ∼P 
 Maintain Revise 
Maintain 1, 1 0, 2 P 
Revise 2, 0 3, 3 
 
Table 4. Interaction of Whimsical agents 
 
In contrast, whenever a social-oriented 
type meets her analogous, there are always two 
Nash equilibria, so that the game needs to be 
solved in its extended form3, i.e. representing 
the development of the interaction over time – 
implying that the agent who moves first in fact 
chooses between two final outcomes, since she 
can effectively predict the next move of her 
counterpart4. Table 5 shows the game-
theoretical representation of the interaction of 
two Contentious agents, both in strategic and 
extended form: here the first to move is 
actually choosing between the alternative 
outcomes MM and RR, and obviously her 
preferred strategy is to choose the best one for 
her (MM). 
This frame of analysis does not change 
when the interaction is between players with 
different motivational profiles, e.g. when P is 
Despotic and ∼P is Agreeable: while the pay-
off are obviously different and the matrix is no 
more symmetric, the situation is still 
analogous, and all these games are easily 
solved, either in strategic or extended form 
                                                           
3 Interaction of social-oriented agents needs a more 
sophisticated analysis exactly because they are 
inclined to coordinate with others via integration of 
their cognitive attitudes. 
4 Technically speaking, such preferred outcome is a 
sub-game perfect equilibrium derived via backward 
induction – moreover, it is the only sub-game 
perfect equilibrium available in this interaction. 
Interested readers may easily verify that, for any 
interaction between agents who share the same 
social-oriented attitude, there is one and only one 
sub-game perfect equilibrium, i.e. one and only one 
preferred outcome, assuming precise knowledge of 
the counterpart’s preferences. 
(Table 6 summarized the Despotic-Agreeable 
case). 
 
 ∼P 
 Maintain Revise 
Maintain 3, 3 1, 0 
P 
Revise 0, 1 2, 2 
 
 
Solved in extended form as follows: 
1st player 2nd player Outcome 
M 3, 3 
M 
R 1, 0 
M 0, 1 
R 
R 2, 2  
 
Table 5. Interaction of Contentious agents 
 
 
 Agreeable ∼P 
 M R 
M 2, 0 3, 3 
Despotic P 
R 1, 2 0, 1 
 
Table 6. Interaction of Despotic P 
with Agreeable ∼P 
 
Of course, different pairs of attitudes 
would lead to different preferred outcomes: 
e.g., while agreement with a Despotic P is in 
the best interest of an Agreeable ∼P, the same 
does not apply if ∼P is instead a Polemist – in 
which case the emergent preferred outcome 
would be a conservative disagreement, i.e. 
each agent would rather prefer to keep her own 
views on the matter. 
More interesting are the cases with two 
social-oriented agents with different 
motivational attitudes. As we noticed before, 
these cases require to represent the game in 
extended form and to assess a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium through backward 
induction. However, since now the agents do 
not share the same motivational profile, such 
equilibrium will change depending on which 
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agent moves first5 in the interaction. This can 
be illustrated by considering the interaction 
between an Open-minded P and a Polemist ∼P 
(Table 7): here the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium is MM whenever the Open-minded 
agent moves first, while it is RM when it is the 
Polemist to make the initial move (notice that 
the pay-offs in Table 7 are ordered such as to 
indicate first the pay-off of the agent who 
initiates the game, and then that of the other 
agent). 
 
When Open-minded moves first: 
Open-minded M R 
Polemist M R M R 
Outcome 1, 2 3, 1 2, 0 0, 3  
When Polemist moves first: 
Polemist M R 
Open-minded M R M R 
Outcome 2, 1 0, 2 1, 3 3, 0  
 
Table 7. Interaction of Open-minded P 
with Polemist ∼P 
 
Applying the same line of reasoning to all 
possible combinations of motivational profiles, 
                                                           
5 It is important to clarify what does it means, in the 
context of this analysis, ‘to move first’, since here 
we are not using game theory to predict the actual 
behaviour of the agents (because what we believe 
depends on our preferences only to a limited extent), 
but rather to predict the specific influence that is to 
be expected over the agent’s belief dynamics, given 
her motivational profile and her assumptions on the 
motivational profile of the counterpart. Under these 
conditions, the agent who moves first simply 
represents the agent whose perspective we are 
considering (as observers) in assessing motivational 
influence over belief dynamics. For instance, if we 
want to capture motivational pressures over belief 
dynamics of an Open-minded agent who assumes to 
face a Polemist opponent, then our analysis predicts 
that the agent will be biased towards maintaining 
her previous belief and making this move explicit, 
knowing that a conservative disagreement will then 
be the preferred outcome for the other agent (see 
Table 7). 
we are able to derive what is the preferred 
outcome for each of them, given the agent’s 
assumptions on the preferences of the other 
player (as summarized in Table 8). 
 
Individual Social 
Cons Expl Coop Anta 
 
Ds Hd Pl Wh Op Ag Ct Po 
Ds MM MM MR MR MR MR MM MM Cons 
Hd MM MM MR MR MR MR MM MM 
Pl RM RM RR RR RM RM RR RR 
Ind 
Expl 
Wh RM RM RR RR RM RM RR RR 
Op RM RM MR MR MR MR MM MM Coop 
Ag RM RM MR MR RM RM RR RR 
Ct MM MM RR RR MR MR MM MM 
Soc 
Anta 
Po MM MM RR RR RM RM RR RR 
 
Table 8: Preferred outcomes under different 
assumptions on the other agent’s motivations 
 
 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE OVER BELIEF 
DYNAMICS UNDER IGNORANCE OF 
THE OPPONENT’S MOTIVATIONS 
 
So far we worked under the assumption 
that both agents know exactly the preferences 
of each other – or better, they are subjectively 
sure of such preferences6. But this does not 
need to be the case between real agents, both 
natural and artificial, that, more often than not, 
will interact without having either precise or 
exhaustive knowledge of each other 
motivational profiles. Hence we need to relax 
this constraint, if we want (as it is the case 
here) to apply this formal analysis to realistic 
cognitive agents7. 
                                                           
6 To shape motivational influence over belief 
dynamics, it does not matter that the agent’s 
convictions on the opponent’s preferences are 
objectively correct (i.e. true): subjective certainty is 
enough. 
7 This move is not new in game theory: e.g., 
Variable Frame Theory (VFT) deals exactly with 
similar issues (see Bacharach, 1993 for a formal 
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This raises an interesting challenge to our 
model: Provided that (1) motivational 
pressures depend also on the agent’s beliefs on 
the opponent’s preferences, but (2) she has no 
sure insight on such preferences, how can we 
assess the motivational influence (if any) on 
her belief dynamics? 
To answer this question, we need to look 
again at the results summarized in Table 8, 
with the aim of discriminating between useful 
and needless information on the opponent’s 
preferences – that is, we check under which 
conditions the preferred outcome for an agent 
with a given motivational profile is unaffected 
by the (presumed) motivational profile of the 
counterpart. We first start by clustering 
together those motivational profiles with 
identical sets of preferred outcomes, as showed 
in Table 9. 
 
 Assumption on the counterpart 
 Cons Expl Open Agree Cont Pole 
Cons MM MR MR MR MM MM 
Expl RM RR RM RM RR RR 
Open RM MR MR MR MM MM 
Agre RM MR RM RM RR RR 
Cont MM RR MR MR MM MM 
Ag
en
t’s
 p
ro
fil
e 
Pole MM RR RM RM RR RR 
 
Table 9. Simplified matrix 
of preferred outcomes 
 
Table 9 highlights that discriminating 
between Despotic and Headstrong opponents, 
or between Pliable and Whimsical ones, does 
not affect the agent’s preferred outcomes, so 
that such information can be disregarded for 
practical purposes. But also another pattern 
                                                                               
introduction, and Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997 for 
experimental verification). «In VFT strategies are 
chosen in a way which is rational in a perfectly 
familiar game-theoretical sense. However, the game 
that gets played is determined by nonrational 
(though not ir-rational) features of the players. 
These are the players’ ‘‘frames.’’ A player’s frame 
is, most simply, the set of variables she uses to 
conceptualize the game» (Bacharach & Bernasconi, 
1997). These variables include, among other 
features, the players’ beliefs on the opponents’ 
preferences. 
becomes obvious, as soon as we focus our 
attention on the player’s ‘preferred option’ (i.e. 
the actual pressure exerted by the agent’s 
motivation on belief dynamics), represented by 
the first letter in each cell of Table 9. Doing so, 
a rather surprising fact emerges: as far as 
motivational pressure is concerned, it is 
relevant to know whether the opponent is 
social-oriented or not, but it does not matter 
knowing the specific motivational profile 
which characterizes the agent’s social attitude 
(either Open-minded, Agreeable, Contentious 
or Polemist). This reduces relevant beliefs on 
the opponent’s motivation to triadic 
alternative: Conservative, Explorative, or 
Social-oriented (Table 10).  
 
Agent’s Opponent is assumed to be: 
profile Conservative Explorative Social-oriented 
Cons M M M 
Expl R R R 
Open R M M 
Agre R M R 
Cont M R M 
Pole M R R 
 
Table 10. Motivational pressure 
under different assumptions 
 
The final output of this analysis is that an 
agent, to be influenced by motivation in her 
belief dynamics, has often to assume 
something on the other agent’s motives, but (1) 
this ‘something’ is not everything, i.e. 
exhaustive assumptions on the opponent’s 
preferences are not needed or even useful, and 
(2) it is possible, given the agent’s 
motivational profile, to predict what kind of 
motivational pressures would be produced by 
each class of assumptions. 
To start with the most trivial cases, 
individual-oriented agents are always affected 
by the same motivational bias, regardless their 
beliefs on the other agent’s preferences: 
Conservative agents will always prefer to 
maintain previous beliefs, while Explorative 
ones will be more inclined to change their 
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convictions. The analysis becomes much more 
interesting, as usual, when it comes to social-
oriented attitudes. If we take for instance an 
Open-minded agent, we can now predict the 
social and motivational pressure exerted on her 
belief dynamics, depending on her 
assumptions on the other agent: if she believes 
her counterpart to be Conservative, she will be 
biased towards revising her previous belief; on 
the contrary, if she has reasons to assume the 
other agent to be either Explorative or Social-
oriented, she will be inclined towards 
confirmation of her own views; finally, if she 
has no hints on the other agent’s attitude, no 
motivational influence is to be expected (at 
least, none of the social kind). Similar 
considerations apply to Agreeable, Contentious 
and Polemist agents as well, along the lines 
presented in Table 10. 
 
EXTENSION TO THE SINGLE-AGENT 
CASE: MOTIVATED MONOLOGUES 
 
We are currently working on some 
extensions of the present framework, built on 
motivational attitudes other than those 
summarized in Table 2. For instance, while 
this paper was mainly focused on the 
interaction between two agents to tackle the 
problem of social influence in belief dynamics, 
we are also extending this approach to the 
individual case, i.e. a single agent who 
internally argues over two (possibly 
contradictory) claims. This requires some 
major adjustments in the basic assumptions, 
but the formal machinery remains the same. 
Table 11 summarizes the basic idea behind this 
extension: here the relevant interaction is 
internal to the agent’s mind, involving a pre-
existing belief and a new incoming information 
(hence the relevant axis is time, rather than 
sociality); the agent can (1) either maintain or 
drop the old belief, and (2) either accept or 
reject the new datum – which results in four 
possible outcomes. On these available options 
the agent can show different basic attitudes, 
both past-directed (concerning what to do with 
old convictions) and future-directed 
(concerning preferred reaction to new 
information). In turn, the interplay between 
past-directed and future-directed attitudes 
defines eight motivational profiles, which call 
for considerations similar to those presented so 
far, although leading to different conclusions. 
 
 NEW INFORMATION 
 Accept Reject 
Maintain expansion stasis OLD 
BELIEF Drop revision contraction 
 
Attitude Criterion (partial ordering) 
Past-directed:  
- CONFIDENT Maintain is preferred over Drop 
- UNSURE Drop is preferred over Maintain 
Future-directed:  
- TRUSTFUL Accept is preferred over Reject 
- SCEPTICAL Reject is preferred over Accept 
 
Table 11. Extension to the individual case 
 
Several points are worth noticing in this 
picture. First of all, the four possible outcomes 
of doxastic dynamics summarized in the upper 
half of Table 11 are closely related to the basic 
operations of AGM belief revision 
(Alchourrón et al., 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988): 
expansion, contraction and revision. Here we 
contemplate also the (trivial) case of stasis, in 
which the old belief state is maintained and the 
new information is rejected. This case was left 
aside in the original AGM paradigm, since 
there the incoming information was assumed 
to be always fully reliable, and as such 
accepted by the agent – a very idealistic 
assumption, that came to be relaxed in more 
recent works on non-prioritized belief revision 
(Hansson et al., 2001). Another point of 
divergence from AGM is in the interpretation 
of expansion and revision. According to AGM, 
when an agent receives a new piece of 
information, she performs either an expansion 
or a revision depending only on the semantic 
compatibility of the new datum with previous 
beliefs: if the new information does not 
contradict previous assumptions, we have an 
expansion of the belief set; otherwise, we have 
Influence of Social Motivation over Belief Dynamics: A Game-Theoretical Analysis 
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a revision, conceptualized as a contraction 
(dropping beliefs in contrast with the new 
datum) followed by an expansion (adding the 
datum to the agent belief set). The framework 
we are outlining in this paper is quite different 
in this respect: here we are not interested in the 
semantic value of old beliefs and new 
information (their contents), because we do not 
aim to describe the actual outcome of belief 
change, but rather the systematic bias that 
might affect such dynamics, and the 
underlying motivations behind that bias. 
As for combining basic attitudes in 
complete motivational profiles, this is done 
along the same lines we discussed before. The 
eight resulting profiles are summarized in 
Table 12. 
 
Past-oriented Motivational Profiles 
 Primary Past-directed Attitude 
 CONF UNSU 
TRUS Self-assured (MA>MR>DA>DR) 
Disproving 
(DA>DR>MA>MR) 
Secondary 
Future-
directed 
Attitude SCEP 
Conservative 
(MR>MA>DR>DA) 
Disbelieving 
(DR>DA>MR>MA)  
Future-oriented Motivational Profiles 
 Primary Future-directed Attitude 
 TRUS SCEP 
CONF Novelty-seeking (MA>DA>MR>DR) 
Over-cautious 
(MR>DR>MA>DA) 
Secondary 
Past-
directed 
Attitude UNSU 
Flexible 
(DA>MA>DR>MR) 
Novelty-fearing 
(DR>MR>DA>MA) 
 
 
Table 12. Motivational profiles 
in monological belief dynamics 
 
These motivational profiles are modelled 
as preference orderings over different 
operations on the agent’s belief state. For 
instance, an agent is conceived as Self-assured 
when her preferences are as follows: expansion 
> stasis > revision > contraction. Such an agent 
shows a strong bias toward confirmation of 
previous beliefs, together with a weaker bias 
towards acceptance of new information. In 
contrast, an agent is regarded as Disproving 
when a trustful attitude is coupled with (and 
dominated by) strong scepticism on the 
reliability of past beliefs: in this case, the agent 
preferences (revision > contraction > 
expansion > stasis) reveals a bias towards 
undermining previous convictions in favour of 
new suggestions. Slightly different is the case 
of a Disbelieving agent, with preferences 
contraction > revision > stasis > expansion: 
here systematic doubt on past beliefs is 
coupled with distrust towards new evidence, so 
that the agent is simply inclined to disbelieve 
most of the claims she is presented with. In a 
similar fashion, all other motivational profiles 
summarized in Table 12 can be characterized 
in cognitive and behavioural terms. 
But what is the import of this frame of 
analysis for the study of individual belief 
dynamics? Since we are now considering the 
single-agent case, we cannot address the 
composition of the agent’s preferences with 
those of any ‘counterpart’, as we did for the 
multi-agent case. Indeed, the very idea of an 
agent ‘arguing with herself’ is to be understood 
mainly as a metaphor, which does not imply 
any notion of a ‘divided self’. On the contrary, 
each agent is assumed to have one and only 
one motivational profile at a given time. 
This was actually to be expected, since, as 
we mentioned before, here the relevant 
dimension is time, not sociality. So an 
interesting set of problems to be tackled within 
this framework concerns the dynamics of these 
preference orderings: How do they change 
over time, e.g. as a function of past 
experiences and current context? Under which 
conditions an agent is expected to take on a 
certain motivational profile in monological 
belief dynamics? Is there any rationale behind 
such preference orderings and their dynamics? 
Although detailed analysis of such issues 
is reserved to future works (see next section), it 
seems we are faced here with yet another 
instances of the complex interplay between 
motives and beliefs. In fact, while motivational 
profiles are likely to affect deeply the agent’s 
belief dynamics, on the other hand they are 
likely to be affected in turn by the agent’s 
understanding of past experiences – that is, by 
(some of) her beliefs. Apart from natural 
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inclination, why should an agent feel either 
confident or unsure of past convictions? And 
why should she be trustful or sceptical towards 
new information? Clearly enough, here the 
agent’s own assessment of past experiences 
and contextual features plays a crucial role in 
shaping her motivational profile. An initially 
trustful agent might easily become cautious, 
after being repeatedly disappointed by her 
informants, or when faced with unknown or 
disconcerting environments – and vice versa. 
Hence what we have here is a bidirectional 
pattern of influence: not only motivational 
profiles influence the process of belief change, 
but also beliefs retro-act on motives, 
contributing to determine the agent’s 
preferences and their change over time. 
This mutual interaction warrants further 
investigations, also in light of its close 
connections with current challenges in the field 
of belief revision formalisms. In our approach 
motivational profiles are captured as 
preference orderings, but such preferences do 
not concern beliefs or belief sets (as it is the 
case with most of the current belief revision 
models), but rather the operations to be 
performed over such sets, so that different 
motivational profiles come to represent 
different preferential strategies for belief 
dynamics. Recently (Rott, 2004) it has been 
argued that it is exactly at this meta-level that 
the role of motivations over belief change is to 
be investigated and understood, and several 
important philosophical issues are to be 
addressed (e.g. determinism vs. voluntarism in 
doxastic change). Our framework provides an 
operational version of some key concepts 
involved in this debate, offering a formal 
background for both theoretical analysis and 
experimental verification. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
The game-theoretical approach presented 
here proved to be insightful for modelling the 
relation between some cognitive features of an 
agent (motivations and beliefs on other agents’ 
motivations) and the specific type of social 
influence to be expected over her belief 
dynamics. This also led to specify what 
assumptions on the other agent’s motives are 
truly relevant in triggering and shaping social 
influence, and how they interact with the 
agent’s own preferences. 
An extension of the model to the single-
agent case was shortly outlined, stressing 
similarities and differences with the multi-
agent case, and showing the relevance of this 
framework for current research on belief 
dynamics. The analysis of the single-agent 
case is still under development, and we are 
considering integrating the results summarized 
here in a more comprehensive model of belief 
change, i.e. Data-oriented Belief Revision 
(Paglieri, 2004). 
Finally, the predictive nature of this 
model opens the way to empirical verification 
of its theoretical predictions. The direction we 
are currently exploring is twofold: on the one 
hand, we aim to test some of the model 
predictions in natural cognitive systems, both 
via economical experiments and through 
structural analysis of natural arguments 
(Paglieri & Castelfranchi, 2004); on the other 
hand, we are trying to implement motivational 
influence over belief dynamics in artificial 
agents, e.g. via agent-based social simulation 
(Castelfranchi, 1998; Paglieri, 2005). 
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